Short-circuiting Short-forms in State v. Singleton and State v. Crowder – North Carolina Criminal Law

Statutes prescribing simplified charging language were intended to alleviate the burdensome pleading requirements of the common law.  See Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.1(c).  Indeed, where a short-form pleading is statutorily authorized, it is not necessary to allege all the elements of the offense.  See State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 259, 307 S.E.2d 339, 350 (1983).  But how closely must a short form track the language prescribed by statute?  The Court of Appeals recently decided a couple of cases that address the issue.  This post considers those cases.

State v. Singleton

In State v. Singleton, 285 N.C. App. 630, 631, 878 S.E.2d 653, 654 (2022), disc. review allowed, __ N.C. __, 883 S.E.2d 445 (2023), the Court of Appeals dealt with an indictment that neither alleged all the elements of the offense charged nor strictly complied with the short-form statute.  My colleague Shea Denning previously posted about Singleton here.

By statute, a person commits second-degree rape when he engages in vaginal intercourse with a person who is physically helpless, and he knows or reasonably should know the other person is physically helpless.  G.S. 14-27.22.  In an indictment for rape of such a person, “it is sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did carnally know and abuse” a person who was physically helpless.  G.S. 15-144.1.  In Singleton, the indictment alleged that the defendant “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did engage in vaginal intercourse with [Jane], who was at the time, physically helpless.”  Singleton, 285 N.C. App. at 632, 878 S.E.2d at 655.

The Court of Appeals recognized that not using the precise language of a short-form statute is not necessarily a fatal defect.  Singleton, 285 N.C. App. at 634, 878 S.E.2d at 656 (citing State v. Tart, 372 N.C. 73, 824 S.E.2d 837 (2019)).  It had no hesitation in equating the term “vaginal intercourse,” as used in the indictment here, with the term “carnal knowledge” prescribed by G.S. 15-144.1.  Id.; cf. State v. Gibert, 229 N.C. App. 476, 480, 747 S.E.2d 253, 256 (2013).  The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the verb “abuse” (or some equivalent) was required as a means of describing the otherwise missing element, namely that the defendant knew or should have known the victim was physically helpless.  Singleton, 285 N.C. App. at 634, 878 S.E.2d at 656.  The indictment “simply fails to allege the crime,” and the Court of Appeals had “no choice” but to vacate the judgment for second-degree rape.  Id.

State v. Crowder

Like the rape indictment in Singleton, the sexual offense indictment in State v. Crowder, No. COA23-833, 2024 WL 2002728 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2024), omitted any reference to the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s condition.

By statute, a person commits second-degree sexual offense when he engages in a sexual act with a person who is physically helpless, and he knows or reasonably should know that the other person is physically helpless.  G.S. 14-27.27.  In an indictment for sexual offense of such a person, “it is sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did engage in a sex offense” with a person who was physically helpless.  G.S. 15-144.2.  In Crowder, the indictment alleged that the defendant “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did engage in a sex offense with [A.P.], who was at the time physically helpless.”  Crowder, 2024 WL 2002728, at *1.

The defendant in Crowder relied on Singleton in arguing that his indictment was defective. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the short form prescribed for the rape of a person who is physically helpless “differs slightly” from the short form prescribed for the sexual offense of such a person.  Crowder, 2024 WL 2002728, at *1.  The indictment in Singleton was defective, it said, because G.S. 15-144.1 (rape) requires the word “abuse,” whereas G.S. 15-144.2 (sex offense) contains no such requirement.  Id.  Unlike in Singleton, the indictment in Crowder “essentially matche[d]” the language prescribed by the short-form statute, and there was therefore no fatal defect.  Id.  The Court of Appeals added in closing that the short-form language “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously” included in the indictment here was “sufficient to apprise Defendant of the mens rea element . . . , namely, that he was aware of the victim’s incapacitated state.”  Crowder, 2024 WL 2002728, at *2; cf. State v. Harris, 219 N.C. App. 590, 596, 724 S.E.2d 633, 638 (2012).

Conclusion

The brevity of the opinion in Crowder (barely four pages) suggests that the issue was not particularly complicated.  The indictment tracks the short form; case closed.  Singleton is easily distinguished because the short-form statute implicated there uses different language.  And yet.

What Singleton added – and what made it a good vehicle for the defendant’s argument in Crowder – was the suggestion that the terms of a statutorily authorized short form are somehow intended to reflect the elements of the offense.  According to Singleton, the word “abuse” in G.S. 15-144.1 stands in for the knowledge element of G.S. 14-27.22 (second-degree rape).  In other words, the short-form statute does not suspend the common law requirement of alleging all the elements (as might have been supposed).  It just translates the elements into more obscure forms.

If Crowder distinguishes Singleton, it also adopts its premise about short-form statutes.  The short form for sexual offense, G.S. 15-144.2, does not actually dispense with the requirement of alleging the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s helpless condition.  Rather, that element may be found in the statutorily prescribed language of “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously.”  And since the indictment in Crowder included that language, the defendant had no basis to complain that the indictment omitted any essential element of the offense.

Of course, the indictment in Singleton included the same language.  Apparently, the same terminology did not import the same knowledge element in that case.  Perhaps “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously” means different things in indictments for rape and sexual offense of a victim who is physically helpless?  So much for eliminating common law technicalities.